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SECURITIES ACTS-ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS-PENSION PLANS-SALE OF
SECURITY-The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois has held that an employee's acquisition of an interest
in a union's collectively bargained, defined-benefit pension plan,
which was both involuntary and noncontributory, involved the sale
of a security subject to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp.
541 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
Before plaintiff, John Daniel, was hired, the defendant union had
established and collectively bargained for employer contributions to
the union's involuntary, noncontributory, defined-benefit pension
plan.' Daniel became a participant in the plan in 1950.2 In 1955, the
union adopted a rule, ratified by. its members, requiring twenty
years of uninterrupted employment with employer sponsors in order
to receive any pension benefits. This eligibility requirement was
communicated to Daniel in the same year.3 Daniel worked for plan
sponsors for twenty-two and one-half years with the exception of his
being laid off for several months in 1960. In 1973, he retired and
applied for a pension benefit. The plan's trustees rejected his appli-
cation; his 1960 lay-off prevented him from accruing twenty years
of uninterrupted employment.
The plaintiff filed a class action against the union and the trus-
1. The plan in which Daniel later acquired an interest was maintained by several employ-
ers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the union. A union member's employ-
ment with any of the several employers contributing to the union's plan would make the
employee a participant in the plan. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp.
541, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
2. The plan was funded solely by the employers' contributions. Members of the local
union came under the plan automatically by reason of their union membership and employ-
ment with a contributing employer. The plan provided a fixed benefit to retiring employees.
Id. at 551-52.
3. In 1958 and later in 1969, relevant information about the plan was compiled in booklet
form and sent to all plan participants. The plaintiff allegedly received these booklets. From
1959, a copy of the trust agreement was available for inspection in the local union office, and,
upon request, would be sent to a participant. In 1971, letters were allegedly sent to all
participants, including the plaintiff, outlining the eligibility requirements. Id. at 544. In the
court's view, a factual issue existed as to whether, in light of the plaintiffs eighth grade
education and claimed difficulty in understanding the intricacies of the plan, the defendants'
disclosures of the break-in-service rules which were couched in technical language adequately
informed the plaintiff of all material facts. Id. at 545.
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tees seeking relief under the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19341 (Securities Acts) based on the Acts'
antifraud provisions.' He alleged that his participation in the pen-
sion plan created an interest involving the sale of a security within
the meaning of the Securities Acts.7 Daniel claimed damages result-
ing from the defendants' misleading statements and omissions of
material facts regarding the length and continuity-of-service re-
quirements.8 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on
alternative grounds. They argued that pension plans were controlled
by other federal legislation,' and that this particular plan involved
neither a security nor a sale-the Securities Acts' nexus require-
ments.'" The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, and
held that the complaint did allege a violation of the antifraud provi-
sions of the Securities Acts in connection with the acquisition of the
pension plan interest."
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Securities Act of 1933].
5. 15 U.S.C. 99 78a-78jj (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Securities Exchange Act of
1934].
6. The Securities Acts make it unlawful for any person, in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of interstate commerce or the mails, to employ any scheme to defraud, to obtain
money by misrepresenting a material fact or failing to disclose a material fact, or to engage
in any transaction which would operate to defraud or deceive a purchaser. See 15 U.S.C. §
77q(a) (1970); id. § 78j(b) (1970). See also rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5 (1976).
7. The plaintiff also alleged that the continuous service rules under the plan were not for
the sole and exclusive benefit of employees and therefore violated § 302(c)(5) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970). 410 F. Supp. at 554-55.
8. Id. at 545-46.
9. The defendants claimed that the comprehensive regulatory scheme and legislative
history of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381
(Supp. 1974), and the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, §§ 2-
12, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed in 1975), preempted the Securities Acts to the extent they
regulated such pension plans. 410 F. Supp. at 546-49. See notes 15-17 and 34-40 and accompa-
nying text infra.
10. See note 6 supra.
11. In order to uphold the plaintiff's claim, the court had to conclude that a private cause
of action existed under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). 410
F. Supp. at 546-47. The Supreme Court has specifically declined to rule on this question.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 n.6 (1975). Other lower courts
do not agree with the Daniel court that such a private right of action exists under § 17(a).
See, e.g., Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. 111. 1974); Welch Foods Inc. v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1399-1401 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (§ 17(a) implies no private
cause of action). But cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme Court
acknowledged the existence of a private cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970), which is by rule similar to § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933.
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The first issue the court addresed was whether the Securities Acts
by their own terms are applicable to employee pension plans. Judge
Kirkland relied heavily on the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's (SEC) interpretation of Congress' rejection in 1934 of pro-
posed amendments to the Securities Act of 1933,12 amendments
which would have exempted from registration certain securities sold
in connection with employee plans. He agreed with the SEC that
the rejection was indicative of Congress' intent that the Securities
Acts be applied to such plans. 13 Furthermore, Congress had specifi-
cally recognized pension funds as securities when it exempted inter-
ests in certain types of pension funds from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Acts." The court was also convinced that
specialized pension legislation, the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
closure Act of 1958 (WPPDA) 5 and the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),11 did not preempt the pension
field. ERISA and WPPDA were enacted to regulate the ongoing
administration of pension plans rather than the entry into such
pension plans; the latter activity was covered by the Securities
Acts. In the court's view, the specialized pension legislation comple-
mented the securities laws and both could be given effect."
Turning to the issue of whether a sale of a security had occurred, 's
12. See note 30 infra.
13. 410 F. Supp. at 547.
14. Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 requires no registration for the sale of
certain exempted securites defined in part as:
[Any interest or participation in a single or collective trust fund maintained by a
bank or . . .insurance company. . . issued in connection with. . .[a qualified]...
pension, or profit-sharing plan. . . other than any plan. . . under which an amount
in excess of the employer's contribution is allocated to the purchase of securities (other
than interests or paticipations in the trust or separate account itself) issued by the
employer ....
15 U.S.C. § 77c(2) (1970). Section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(c)(12) (1970), contains a similar provision.
15. Pub. L. No. 85-836, §§ 2-12, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed in 1975).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. 1974).
17. 410 F. Supp. at 548. The court determined that, in view of the savings clauses con-
tained in WPPDA and the Securities Acts, which preserve remedies under other laws, the
antifruad provisions would apply to pension plans regardless of whether pension legislation
precluded the Securities Acts' procedural regulation of pension plans. Id. at 549.
18. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "sale" as follows:
The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security
or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell", "offer for sale", or "offer"
shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a
security or interest in a security, for value.
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Judge Kirkland noted that the statutory definition of a security
included investment contracts. 9 Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,20 he determined that an interest
in a pension plan such as the one involved in Daniel falls within the
definition of an investment contract. To satisfy the Howey test, a
pension plan interest would have to involve a scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and expects profits
solely from the efforts of the plan sponsor or a third party." The plan
satisfied the Howey criteria since pension plan contributions are the
employee's investment,22 the pension fund is the common enterprise
in which the trustees have sole power of control over the invest-
ments, and profits are expected in the form of retirement benefits.1
3
"Sale" as statutorily defined in the Securities Acts requires the
disposition of a security for value.24 Whether value was given for the
plaintiff's interest in the plan was the only statutory question in
Daniel as far as the sale issue was concerned. The court ruled that
the value element was satified either by the employee providing
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). Sale is similarly defined in § 3(a)(14) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral -trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security
• . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any
certificate of interest or participation in . . . any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). Security is similarly defined in § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970).
19. See § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
20. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the Supreme Court held that the offering for sale of
units of a citrus grove development, coupled with a contract for developing property and
remitting profits, constituted the offer for sale of a security in the nature of an investment
contract requiring registration under the Securities Acts. Id. at 299.
21. Id. at 301.
22. The court prefaced its analysis of the sale issue by emphasizing that the Securities
Acts were remedial legislation and traditionally such legislation was broadly construed in the
interest of protecting investors through full disclosures. 410 F. Supp. at 550. The conclusion
that plan contributions are the employee's investment is based on the theory that pension
plan benefits were uniformly recognized as part of an employee's wage package. See S. REP.
No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958). See also Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pension benefits are a proper subject of
collective bargaining for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act).
23. 410 F. Supp. at 551.
24. For the language used to define sale see note 18 supra.
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services or contributing a portion of his wages.25 The plaintiff had
given value, and his eligibility to ratify the wage package evidenced
an investment decision; thus, in the court's view, its holding was not
inconsistent with the SEC's policy 26 of refusing to find a sale in a
pension plan situation unless both value and an investment decision
were present.Y
Daniel marks the first successful attempt to implement the Se-
curities Acts' antifraud provisions to remedy pension plan abuses
where a sale of stock was not involved.28 The court's determination
that the Securities Acts are at least facially applicable to pension
plans not involving a sale of stock 29 is supported by a number of
factors: the Acts' legislative history, 3° the statutory language itself,
25 410 F. Supp. at 552, 553.
26. See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra for a fuller discussion of this policy
of the SEC.
27. 410 F. Supp. at 553.
28. Prior to Daniel, several cases involving employee benefit plans had arisen under the
antifraud provisions, but they had generally involved plans under which stock was purchased
or sold. See, e.g., Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (10(b) action
involving a stock bonus trust fund). The only case discovered in which an antifraud liability
action was brought with respect to a plan not involving stock transactions was Kaminsky v.
Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The case was dismissed on other grounds and
the issue of whether an interest in such a plan involved the sale of a security subject to the
antifraud provisions was not developed. For commentary concerning the applicability of the
Securities Acts to employee benefit plans see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 506-11 (2d
ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Hipple & Harkelroad, Anomalies of SEC
Enforcement: Two Areas of Concern, 24 EMORY L.J. 697 (1975); Mundheim & Henderson,
Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 795 (1964); Comment, Securities Aspects of Pension, Profit-Sharing, and
Stock Bonus Plans, 17 S.W.L.J. 444 (1963); Note, Pension Plans as Securities, 96 U. PA. L.
REV. 549 (1948); 1 CCH PENS. PLAN GUIDE 1100-1218 (1977).
29. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
30. The legislative history of the Securities Acts demonstrates a gradual congressional
acknowledgment of the security-like nature of an interest in a pension plan. A review of the
committee reports and records of hearings preceding enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
discloses no mention of pension plans. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); H.R.
REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See also Hearings on H.R. 5832 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 877-78, 895 (1941)
[hereinafter referred to as 1941 Hearings]. The drafters of the Securities Act of 1933 claimed
it was not Congress' intent to include pension plans within the purview of the Act. Id.
In 1934, the Senate proposed amendments to the 1933 Act which would have exempted
from registration certain offerings made solely to employees of an issuer in connection with
a bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock-investment plan for the
exclusive benefit of such employees. The amendments were rejected in conference for the
reason that participants in stock-investment plans may need protection as much as other
members of the public. See H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934); 1941 Hearings,
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and the Acts' registration requirements. In the Securities Acts' ex-
empted securities provisions, the specific references to "securities
(other than interests or participations in the trust or separate ac-
count itself) issued by the employer"' suggests that not only stock
sold in connection with a plan, but also the interest in a pension
"trust" conforms to the definition of a security. Furthermore, the
SEC has applied the Securities Acts' registration requirements
which, like the antifraud provisions, are applicable where the sale
of a security is involved, to securities sold in connection with em-
ployee benefit plans.32  The SEC's requirement for registration of
both stock sold in connection with, and interests in, certain em-
ployee benefit plans implies not only that the Securities Acts may
be applied to pension plans, but also that the acquisition of an
interest in such a plan comprises the sale of a security for purposes
of the Acts.Y
supra at 895. During the 1941 hearings, SEC Commissioner Purcell stated that the rejection
of the 1934 Senate-proposed amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 was interpreted as
applying the Act to employee plans involving the sale of a security. Any pension plan under
which employees were given the oportunity to place part of their earnings in a fund to be
invested for their benefit and returned to them at a later date involved the offering of an
investment contract. He noted that employee plans were comparable to investment compa-
nies, which offer securities to the public at large. Id. at 895-96, 905. Significantly, the fact
that Congress did exempt certain pension plans from the definition of a securities company
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970), suggests
that without the exemption, the definition of a security would include pension plans. See 1941
Hearings, supra at 895.
In 1941, the SEC invited suggestions to relieve plans from undue registration burdens while
retaining the Securities Acts' safeguards in situations where employees might need protec-
tion. See SEC SECURnEs Aar RELEASE No. 2485 (Feb. 27, 1941). These efforts culminated in
the SEC proposals to amend the Securities Acts by exempting from registration requirements
certain interests in plans meeting certain standards, and authorizing the SEC to exempt other
plans by promulgating rules. See 1941 Hearings, supra at 887-1021. Another bill, H.R. 6437,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), proposed to exclude interests in all kinds ofemployee benefit
plans from the definition of security. No action was taken on either proposal.
Whatever the reasons for Congress' refusal to exempt pension plans from registration or
other provisions of the Securities Acts, it is apparent that Congress was cognizant of the
security-like nature of interests in pension plans and the SEC's intention to treat them as
such. Finally, in 1970, Congress did specifically recognize pension plans by exempting certain
plan interests from the Securities Acts' registration requirements. For the language of the
exempted securities provision see note 14 supra. The logical inference is that Congress recog-
nized that interests in certain pension plans did involve the sale of securities and would have
to be registered unless exempted from registration.
31. For the appropriate language defining exempted securities in § 3(a)(2) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(2) (1970), see note 14 supra.
32. See authorities cited at note 33 infra.
33. Under certain stock purchase plans involving the sale of employer stock, both the
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The Daniel court's reasoning that subsequent pension legislation
did not preclude the Securities Acts' applicability to pension plans
is persuasive. The defendants maintained that the exemption provi-
sions of the securities legislation regarding pension plans, 4 viewed
in light of WPPDA and ERISA, indicated Congress' desire to have
the Securities Acts not apply to pension plans. The exemptions were
designed, however, only to reduce the registration burden on small
plans, and the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts should
still apply to pension plans involving the sale of a security. 5 In
addition, a comparison of the reporting and disclosure provisions of
WPPDA and ERISA with those of the Securities Acts supports a
conclusion that the laws serve different functions, undermining the
defendants' argument that the pension legislation's more demand-
ing requirements suggest preemption." ERISA, the more compre-
hensive pension law, does not require disclosure of break-in-service
rules and other material facts to employee-participants until ninety
days after the employee becomes a participant in the plan. 7 In
contrast, the Securities Acts' antifraud provisions require disclosure
of material facts on or before entry into the plan-at the point of
sale.3 In practical effect, then, the laws are complementary; ERISA
requires post-participation disclosure and the Securities Acts man-
securities and the interests in the plan may be securities requiring registration. Additionally,
in certain employee savings plans where no employer stock is sold, the interests in the plan
may be securities requiring registration. See 1 CCH PENS. PLAN GUIDE 1100-1218 (1977).
See generally Givner, ESOPs and the Federal Securities Laws, 31 Bus. LAw. 1889 (1976);
Overman, Registration and Exemption from Registration of Employee Compensation Plans
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 28 VAND. L. REy. 455 (1975).
34. Section 3(b)(11) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(11)
(1970), specifically excluded certain employee pension trusts from the definition of an invest-
ment company. The 1970 amendments to the Securities Acts specifically exempted from
registration requirements interests issued in connection with certain pension plans. See note
30 supra.
35. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4897, 4907
(1970).
36. A review of the pension laws' legislative history provides no answer to the preemption
issue. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PULuC WELFARE, INTERIM
REPORT OF AcTvmEs OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. REP. No. 634, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEsS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, vol. I (Comm. Print 1976).
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (Supp. 1974).
38. See note 6 supra for a summary of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts which
require disclosure of material facts during a sale.
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date pre-participation disclosure. 9
If the pension legislation was intended to be all-encompassing,
such legislation should render inapplicable other provisions of the
Securities Acts which relate to pension plans. Yet the SEC contin-
ues to exercise jurisdiction over certain pension plans where regis-
tration is concerned, further suggesting that preemption was not
intended. 0 Congress' failure to expressly confer in ERISA or
WPPDA exclusive regulatory control over all pension matters by
specifically preserving other federal laws governing pension plans"
also implies that the Securities Acts' antifraud provisions apply to
pension plans involving the sale of a security.2
The Daniel court's finding that a security was involved is tenable.
In a pension plan context, a security can be treated as either an
investment contract or a profit-sharing agreement;13 the former ap-
proach was adopted in Daniel. The basic definition of an investment
contract set forth in Howey has been recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court, with minor modification, in United Housing Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Forman." Under the Howey test, the major area of
dispute concerned the profit criterion of the sale; the investment
must be made with the expectation that it will generate a profit.
Forman requires, in addition to the Howey criteria, that the primary
39. The basic presumption against the implied repeal or displacement of prior laws sup-
ports the conclusion that ERISA and the Securities Acts are complementary. Where different
legislative acts concern a similar subject, and a repealing intent is not clearly disclosed, the
laws will stand together and be given consonant operation where such a construction is
reasonably possible. See 1A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (C. Sands 45th
ed. 1972).
40. See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. 1974). The Daniel court also cited the savings clauses of
WPPDA and the Securities Acts as evidence of congressional intent not to preempt the
Securities Acts. 410 F. Supp. at 549. See note 17 supra.
42. The jurisdictional boundaries of ERISA (and WPPDA) and the Securities Acts are
notably confused, attributable in part to the SEC's failure to provide significant comment
to Congress during the drafting of ERISA. See BNA PENS. REP. No. 78, at A-10 (1976) (noting
the SEC's lack of such input). Absent congressional clarification of when a plan involves a
sale of a security, actions under the Securities Acts' antifraud provisions may be expected to
recur leaving to the courts the task of determining when the Securities Acts are applicable.
43. See Loss, supra note 28, at 506-11.
44. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Forman expressly reaffirmed the Howey test as the touchstone
for defining investment contracts, and held that shares of stock purchased from a housing
cooperative did not constitute investment contracts within the purview of the Securities Acts.
Its refusal to find an investment contract was based upon the belief that the spirit of the
Securities Acts militated against protecting persons purchasing commodities for personal
consumption. Id. at 848, 858.
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purpose of the investment be to obtain the profits.15 The Daniel
defendants argued that no profits could be expected from a pension
plan that provided a definite benefit rather than a benefit depen-
dent upon the earnings of the plan trust fund. Yet benefits under
the plan are reasonably expected to exceed contributions due to the
fund's earning capacity; under that analysis, the profit element is
arguably satisfied." Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff actually
made an investment, the primary purpose of the investment would
be to realize profits, whether they be the growth of the fund or the
total retirement benefit. The Forman test is satisfied and a security
in the nature of an investment contract is present.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Daniel case is that its
disposition of the sale issue effectively repudiates the SEC's no-sale
rule" regarding pension plans as an unrealistic approach to resolv-
ing the sale issue in the context of the antifraud provisions. Under
its no-sale rule, the SEC will not find a sale where a plan is either
noncontributory or involuntary despite the fact the statutory defini-
tion of sale is ostensibly satisfied. The rule stipulates that both
value and an investment decision must be found in a pension plan
context before a sale has occurred and the antifraud provisions are
applied. The SEC's reasoning is that when a plan is noncon-
tributory, the employee has received a gift and has not given value
which is a statutory requirement of a sale; when a plan is involun-
45. Under Forman, where there is an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others, an investment contract will be found. The primary purpose of the investment,
under Forman, must be to obtain the profit; the investment must be economically induced.
Id. at 852.
46. Generally, a defined-benefit pension plan is a retirement plan whereby a plan sponsor
makes contributions which are actuarially determined to provide a fixed or defined retirement
benefit. The actuarial determination assumes a certain rate of earnings for the funds contrib-
uted and usually the contribution will grow, through fund earnings, to provide benefits
substantially exceeding contributions. Profit is, therefore, a very realistic element of a
defined-benefit plan from a contributor's view. See generally S. GOLDBERG, PENSION PLANS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-24 (1974); CCH PENS. PLAN GUIDE (1977); P-H PENS. & PROFIT-
SHARING FORMS (1977).
47. The SEC no-sale theory is basically an administrative policy designed to alleviate the
burdens of registration under the Securities Acts by finding no sale of a security. See Letter
from Assistant General Counsel of Securities and Exchange Commission to Commerce Clear-
ing House, Inc., May 12, 1953, in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2105.50 (1977); CCH DEC.
75,195 (1941-44); Letter from Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities
and Exchange Commission to Commerce Clearing House, Inc., August 1, 1962, in 1 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 2105.52 (1977).
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tary, the employee has made no investment decision or choice and
would not logically need the protection of the Securities Acts.48
Because the plan in Daniel was both involuntary and non-
contributory, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff either had
not given value for his interest or had made no investment decision.
The court's finding of value in the contribution of a portion of the
plaintiffs wages49 or services 0 is, however, well-supported. It was
argued in Daniel that there is no choice of whether or not to partici-
pate (invest) in a pension plan when it is negotiated on an industry-
wide basis because the plaintiff's ratification vote may provide an
individual no effective control if other union members oppose him.
If a court were to examine the reasoning applied in analogous corpo-
rate merger cases, where collective ratification also takes place by
way of voting, that argument is attenuated. It has consistently been
held that Securities Acts' antifraud liability may obtain where
shareholders vote to approve mergers based on misleading facts.5'
This protection is available to shareholders regardless of the way
they voted .5 A union member voting to ratify an amendment to a
pension plan has the same degree of choice as a shareholder voting
in a merger situation and should be similarly protected.
The Daniel determination that a sale of a security occurred for
antifraud purposes appears to be consistent with public policy con-
siderations. The need to protect investors was recognized by the
Supreme Court in both Howey53 and Forman54 as an underlying
factor compelling a broad definition of security. Since ERISA does
not require pre-participation disclosures,55 nor apply retroactively, 5
48. There is some doubt whether the no-sale rule is applicable in the antifraud liability
area since the rule specifically addresses the sale issue in the context of registration. See
authorities cited at note 47 supra. If the rule did not apply in situations where fraud has been
alleged, the finding of a sale would be much easier.
49. See note 22 supra.
50. There is authority for the proposition that the value element for purposes of finding a
sale is satisfied by the performance of services. See, e.g., Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282
(D. Mass. 1972).
51. See Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966). See
also Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (where approval of sale of
corporate assets was fraudulently obtained, stockholders permitted to bring action under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
52. See cases cited at note 51 supra.
53. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 301 (1946).
54. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S 837, 849 (1975).
55. Pre-participation, material omissions regarding pension plans would not be actionable
under ERISA because civil actions for material omissions are generally conditioned upon
Vol. 15: 359
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a failure to disclose a material fact affecting an employee's rights
in a pension plan which occurred prior to an employee's participa-
tion in a plan or prior to enactment of ERISA would be insulated
from an effective statutory remedy if Daniel were decided differ-
ently. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder7 restricts antifraud liability to cases involv-
ing intentional as opposed to negligent material omissions. Employ-
ees intentionally deceived by plan sponsors would certainly be in
need of the Securities Acts' protection.
If Daniel is upheld on appeal, it will establish a remedial prece-
dent in an expanding pension field. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that because the Securities Acts might apply to pension
plans does not mean that all plans will be subject to the Acts'
antifraud provisions. Only those pension plans involving the sale of
a security will be subject to antifraud liability and an investment
decision will still be required to establish a sale. The mere fact that
a plan is involuntary or noncontributory, however, will not foreclose
suit. Unless Congress acts to clarify the scope of the Securities Acts'
applicability to pension plans, the sale-of-a-security determination
will have to be made on a case by case basis. If Daniel is reversed
based on a finding that either no security or no sale was involved,
other plaintiffs might conceivably obtain relief under the antifraud
provisions where a sale of a security is established. Thus, other types
of employee benefit plans could be implicated.
The consequences of applying the Securities Acts' antifraud pro-
visions to pension plans and the court's rejection of the SEC no-sale
theory are difficult to predict.55 The ultimate impact of Daniel may
disclosures required under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. 1974). ERISA does not require
pre-participation disclosures. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. 1974).
57. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court held that an action for civil
damages could not be maintained under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), absent an allegation of scienter or some intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud. 425 U.S. at 214.
58. Several potential ramifications relevant to the Daniel decision are beyond the scope
of this note. The court's rationale may be extended to non-collective bargaining situations in
which an individual negotiates wage and pension benefits with a prospective employer. If so,
every pension plan in existence may be affected. A union may be able to avoid providing a
union member with an investment decision by simply removing the ratification procedure.
This may be disruptive to the collective bargaining process. The rejection of the SEC no-sale
rule may also be extended into the registration area, causing plan interests to be registered.
This could be an expensive, time-consuming, and, in view of ERISA, a duplicative disclosure
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be to discourage employers who fear antifraud liability or high costs
regarding disclosures from adopting new plans. The decision may
cause other employers to terminate existing plans. This would mili-
tate against an express governmental policy of encouraging the im-
plementation of private pension plans.59 Daniel's effect on the inter-
ests of plan sponsors was not fully explored by the court. A more
thorough analysis of the competing interests at stake, including a
balancing of the collective interests of plan sponsors against the
interests of plan participants, should be undertaken. With this ac-
commodation in mind, prompt congressional action to define when
a plan interest involves the sale of a security, and to clarify the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Securities Acts and ERISA, would
obviate potential confusion and a drawn out process of judicial rule-
making. 0
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process. The most desirable approach may be to amend ERISA to require more immediate
disclosure in order to satisfy the Securities Acts' disclosure requirements and avoid
duplicative reporting. Finally, Daniel provides no effective guideline for determining when a
pension plan interest becomes a security. Legislative action to avoid disclosure duplications
or to clarify the jurisdictional boundaries of the Securities Acts and ERISA would obviate a
proliferation of litigation on both antifraud and registration issues and restore some degree
of certainty in these areas of the law.
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1974).
60. As evidence of the confusion in this area, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California has recently held, in sustaining a motion to dismiss, that an
interest in an employee benefit plan trust is not a security, that the acquisition of the interest
is not a sale under the Securities Acts, and that the exclusive remedy for disputes over pension
benefits is provided by ERISA. Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing Heating &
Piping Indus., 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
The SEC has filed an amicus curiae brief in Daniel contending that the antifraud provisions
of the Securities Acts do protect Mr. Daniel and that ERISA was not meant to compromise
such protection. Brief of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976). The Daniel decision has been appealed and is now
pending before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
